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An Analysis of the Scientific Status and Limitations of The Attitudinal Entropy Framework 
and an Initial Test of Some of Its Empirical Predictions  
Dalege, Borsboom, van Harreveld, and van der Maas (this issue) describe a novel framework for 
the conceptualization of attitudes that draws on principles from statistical mechanics. A core idea 
in their framework is that systems are often characterized by randomness (i.e., entropy) and that 
there is both heuristic and predictive value in applying the idea of entropy to the study of 
attitudes and related phenomena. We applaud their initiative: the attitudinal entropy framework 
provides an intriguing new perspective on theoretical questions and empirical findings in social 
psychology. It opens up new avenues for research in many areas and is a timely contribution 
given the growing popularity of predictive processing theories emphasizing entropy as an 
important factor in human cognition (for a recent overview see Metzinger & Wiese, 2017).  
Nevertheless, we believe that there is still room for improvement. In the first part of this 
paper, we present an epistemological analysis that clarifies the way in which the Attitudinal 
Entropy Framework contributes to scientific knowledge. The second section of the paper focusses 
on a number of limitations of the framework as it was formulated by Dalege et al. (this issue), 
most prominently their shallow treatment of inferential processes. Finally, we present empirical 
data concerning two of the predictions put forward by Dalege and colleagues.  
The Scientific Contribution of the Attitudinal Entropy Framework 
Science is most prominently concerned with two tasks: to describe and to explain. In 
psychology, phenomena are typically explained at the functional level (i.e., explaining behavior 
in terms of elements in the environment; e.g., Skinner, 1953) or at the cognitive level (i.e., 
explaining the impact of environment on behavior in terms of mental mechanisms; e.g., Gardner, 
1987). Dalege and colleagues (this issue) suggest that the contribution of their framework is 
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situated mainly at the cognitive level of explanation: it is assumed to deal with the nature and 
operation of the mental system, most prominently (changes in) the entropy of mental 
representations. We believe, however, that the main contribution of the framework lies at the 
descriptive level and at the functional level of explanation.  
First, the concept of entropy is descriptive in nature. Boltzmann entropy describes the 
consistency between the elements of one microstate whereas Gibbs entropy describes the 
consistency between different microstates.  
Second, the concept of entropy reduction has explanatory value at the functional level of 
explanation. Specifically, a State X at Time N is said to emerge because of the high entropy of 
State Y at Time N-1. The concept of entropy reduction as such says nothing about the (physical 
or mental) mechanisms via which a high entropy state gives rise to a low entropy state; it merely 
captures the idea that the emergence of the low entropy State X is a function of the high entropy 
of a preceding State Y.1  
Third, also the Causal Attitude Network on which the Attitudinal Entropy Framework is 
built, can be conceived of as situated at the functional level of explanation. Within the CAN 
model, elements are linked within a network. Whereas Dalege et al. (this issue) conceive of the 
networks and their elements as mental entities (i.e., information represented in memory), one can 
also think of the elements as behaviors. In fact, if one looks at how network models are used in 
psychology, they are typically based on what people verbally report about their behavior, 
feelings, and thoughts. Rather than making the questionable assumption that verbal reports 
-                                                 
1
 Note that the explanatory value of entropy reduction at the functional level hinges upon the ability to 
manipulate directly the entropy of State Y. To the extent that the entropy of State Y can be manipulated only 
indirectly by manipulating elements in the environment, it makes more sense to say that State X is a function of those 
elements in the environment and that the entropy of State Y mediates the functional relation between the elements in 
the environment and State X (see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986, for a related discussion). 
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provide a direct and accurate reflection of mental representations (Schwarz, 2007), one can treat 
them as behaviors, much like any other movement of muscles or glands can be treated as a 
behavior. Within the domain of attitude research this would, for instance, imply that an 
inconsistency between self-reported liking of a product and buying behavior is not treated as an 
attitude-behavior inconsistency (which implies that self-reported liking is a proxy of the 
underlying mental attitude) but as a behavior-behavior inconsistency.  
This perspective is compatible with the idea that attitude research deals with the study of 
evaluation, that is, the way in which stimuli influence evaluative responses (De Houwer, 2009; 
De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). It implies that both the CAN model and the 
Attitudinal Entropy Framework have much to contribute to attitude research. One of the big 
assets of network models such as the CAN model is that they provide new ways of describing 
relations between (evaluative) behaviors. To the extent that the relations between behaviors in a 
network are assumed to be directional (rather than merely correlational), networks also provide 
functional explanations of behavior, that is, insights into how one behavior is a function of other 
behaviors or states in the environment. Such functional explanations allow one to predict and 
influence behavior by observing and influencing other behavior or states in the environment.2 
The integration of the CAN model within an entropy framework further expands the descriptive 
and functional explanatory value of the CAN model by linking it with concepts such as entropy 
and entropy reduction. Note, however, that all of this can be achieved without invoking any 
reference to mental constructs such as mental representations. In fact, this conclusion is 
-                                                 
2
 Note that the explanatory value of behavior-behavior relations at the functional level is limited by the fact 
that most if not all behaviors can be influenced only indirectly by changing the environment. Indeed, when the ability 
to influence a behavior is used as the criterion for the successful explanation of that behavior, a successful 
explanation of Behavior X in terms of Behavior Y requires the specification of those environmental variables that 
determine Behavior Y. This implies that functional explanations in psychology always boil down to knowledge 
about environment-behavior relations (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). 
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unsurprising given that both entropy frameworks and network models have been developed in 
areas of research such as physics and mathematics that focus on description and functional 
explanations. 
One might argue that the Attitudinal Entropy Framework could in principle also be 
applied at the cognitive level of explanation by using it to describe and explain the nature of 
mental representations. The problem with this approach is that (the elements of) mental 
representations cannot be observed directly (Gardner, 1987). Hence, applying the framework at 
the cognitive level necessarily adds a level of uncertainty compared to when the framework is 
restricted to the descriptive or functional level. We therefore believe that there are advantages to 
applying the framework at the descriptive and functional level as compared to the cognitive level. 
Regardless of the level of explanation at which the framework is likely to be most successful, it 
would be good to always be explicit about the level of explanation at which the framework is 
being used. Because different questions are addressed at different levels of explanation, 
confounding levels can distort scientific debates. An example of such a confound can be found in 
the simulations that Dalege et al. (this issue) present. Whereas in some simulations, nodes within 
the network are assumed to refer to attitude elements within the cognitive system of a single 
individual (an intrapersonal model at the cognitive level), in other simulations, the nodes refer to 
behavior of individuals in a group (an interpersonal model at the functional level). A lack of 
clarity around what level of explanation is being modeled (i.e., functional vs. mental level, 
intrapersonal vs. interpersonal) raises more questions than it answers.  
Of course, our analysis does not imply that one should abandon the cognitive level of 
explanation in attitude research. We only argue that attitude research which focusses on 
description and functional explanation also has merit and that the Attitudinal Entropy Framework 
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can contribute to attitude research at those levels. Such research can be complemented by theories 
about the mental mechanisms that mediate evaluation. In fact, Dalege et al. (this issue) seem to be 
aware of this fact when they refer to the need to understand the inferences that underlie the links 
in networks and the motivational processes that determine the dependency within networks. As 
we will argue below, there is indeed much merit in considering the role of motivation and 
inferential processes in attitude research. Although theories about mediating mental mechanisms 
can certainly be related to the Attitudinal Entropy Framework, much of the scientific merit of the 
framework itself is, in our opinion, situated at the descriptive level and functional level of 
explanation.  
Limitations of the Attitudinal Entropy Framework 
 Despite its merits, the Attitudinal Entropy Framework as it was put forward by Dalege 
and colleagues is also limited in important ways. First, attitude elements are modeled as nodes 
that can only be switched on or off and are thus stripped from any (relational) content (e.g., the 
content of beliefs), making it difficult to see how consistency between attitude elements could be 
determined. The assumption that only the (momentary) valence of attitude elements (modeled as 
a binary variable) is compared in this process is unfeasible given that it is not specified how the 
valence of attitude elements (not only beliefs but also behaviors and feelings) is determined. 
Moreover, studies show that content-related characteristics of information about attitude objects 
(e.g., its diagnosticity or believability: Cone, Mann, & Ferguson, 2018) determine evaluation 
more than the amount of positive and negative information. For instance, Cone and Ferguson 
(2015) found that participants exhibited negative rather than positive implicit and explicit 
evaluations of a person named Bob when they learned many pieces of positive information about 
ANALYZING ATTITUDINAL ENTROPY                 7 
Bob but only one piece of negative information that was, however, more diagnostic of Bob’s true 
character (e.g., that Bob was a child molester).  
Second, as noted earlier, Dalege and colleagues refer to cognitive concepts such as 
inferences and motivation. However, their treatment of these concepts is rather superficial. With 
regard to the concept of motivation, they argue that the mental system is motivated to reduce 
entropy because that entropy causes distress. However, without an explanation of the 
motivational role of entropy, the current framework pushes the question of attitudes back from 
explaining attitudes to explaining entropy and distress. Note that modeling of entropy (described 
as consistency detection) does not solve this issue because this modeling is also merely 
descriptive and does not directly tie into important mental level concepts.  
In the remainder of this section, we discuss in quite some detail the role of inferential 
processes within the Attitudinal Entropy Framework. Whereas Dalege and colleagues (this issue) 
refer to this topic only briefly, we believe that inferential processes are vital when extending the 
framework to the cognitive level of explanation. In a recent paper, we described an inferential 
account of evaluative stimulus-action effects that focuses on the inferences that underlie 
evaluative learning on the basis of stimulus-based actions (e.g., repeated approach or avoidance 
of a stimulus) and outlines how these inferences might arise based on predictive processing 
principles (Van Dessel, Hughes, & De Houwer, in press).3 Specifically, evaluative responding is 
considered to result from inferences about (the value of) action outcomes. These inferences are 
learning-, context, and goal-dependent, and reflect the (automatic) application of inference rules 
-                                                 
3
 Although our inferential model mainly focuses on evaluative stimulus-action effects it can easily be (and 
already has been) generalized to explain other pathways via which evaluative behavior is established or changed (for 
one such example in the context of evaluative conditioning see De Houwer, in press). 
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to activated information on the basis of a person’s belief network (which can be seen as a 
generative model of the world that is continuously updated on the basis of available information).  
The Attitudinal Entropy framework and our inferential model share several similarities 
with one another. For instance, the former argues that entropy (and its reduction) may play a key 
role determining the structure and properties of attitudes, a claim that is certainly compatible with 
the inferential account given its incorporation of predictive processing theory (Friston, 2010). 
Second, the Attitudinal Entropy framework seems to share the position that implicit and explicit 
attitudes are based on a single type of mental process that involves inferential reasoning. For 
instance, Dalege and colleagues note that “weights between attitude elements generally arise 
based on inferences” (p.12). Moreover, assessing for entropy (which they conceptualize in part as 
consistency between attitude elements) presumably requires the mental system to be able to 
represent the truth value of attitude elements (and relations between these elements). This 
perspective is compatible with single process (propositional) models of attitudes and learning (De 
Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) and diverges from models which 
distinguish between two types of attitudinal processes or systems: e.g., System 1 vs 2 
(Kahneman, 2003), associative vs. rule-based processes (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), or associative 
and propositional processes (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). It also accords with recent 
recommendations to explore alternatives to dual-process theories of human cognition (e.g., 
Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018), a call which is especially relevant to attitude research where such 
theories remain dominant and often in the absence of clear empirical support (see Corneille & 
Stahl, 2018).  
Importantly, however, there are two points of divergence between our inferential model 
and the attitudinal entropy framework. First, within the inferential model, a clear distinction is 
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made between the functional and cognitive level of explanation (see De Houwer et al., 2013). 
Specifically, we model evaluations (rather than attitudes), which we define as the impact of 
stimuli on evaluative responses. This ensures that there is no conflation between the behaviors 
that need to be explained (evaluations) and the mental constructs that are used to explain these 
behaviors (inferences), allowing for clear, testable predictions about the moderation of evaluative 
responses by specific contextual variables.  
Second, our model describes how inferences might arise and how they can lead to 
evaluative responses. To move forward, the attitudinal entropy framework might benefit from the 
integration of basic principles from other (e.g., inferential reasoning) models. Most importantly, 
the framework might integrate ideas about how evaluations are learned (e.g., on the basis of 
context-dependent inferences: Van Dessel et al., in press) to allow for a more encompassing 
computation of attitude consistency and a model of evaluative behavior. For instance, the 
motivational role of attitudinal entropy might be elucidated on the basis of current theorizing on 
inferential reasoning. In our inferential model of evaluative stimulus-action effects, we refer to 
entropy as a motivational factor in the context of belief updating. We consider entropy not as a 
characteristic of an attitude (what would be the delineating factor of a configuration of attitude 
elements?) but of a more general belief system. This idea draws on predictive processing theories 
in which entropy reduction motivates inferences (and behavior) because it allows for the 
conservation of mental energy (Friston, 2010). However, we only briefly refer to entropy in the 
inferential theory we described. Moreover, it has been noted that the conceptualization of entropy 
in the predictive processing framework is implausible and requires more work (e.g., Otworowska, 
Van Rooij, & Kwisthout, 2018). In the spirit of the attitudinal entropy model, it might be useful 
to provide a more extensive description of entropy. For instance, entropy could be more clearly 
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defined as a factor that determines the circumstances under which a person’s belief system is 
updated. We could model entropy as the extent to which integration of information is difficult in 
that it requires more extensive updating of probabilities in the model. Other variables such as 
inferred value of information (e.g., for our survival or our self-concept) might be included in this 
calculation such that entropy is not the only principle that determines inferences and belief 
updating (which seems problematic: Otworowska et al., 2018). Such modeling that is tied to 
tangible mental constructs in a model that clearly separates levels of explanation might provide a 
clear contribution to the literature (e.g., in terms of its explanatory value). 
Predictions Tested 
While this commentary has primarily focused on conceptual matters, we also had the 
opportunity to test two of the framework’s predictions that Dalege and colleagues argue flow 
from their model with data we already had at hand. We used data from the Attitudes 2.0 dataset 
(Hussey et al., 2018) to assess predictions number 1b and 3. Data to test other predictions was not 
at hand. This large dataset (number of experimental sessions > 409,000) represents a single large 
study of implicit and explicit attitudes that was conducted on the Project Implicit website 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu). Subsets of this dataset have been used in previous research (e.g., 
Nosek & Hansen, 2008), and the full dataset is being curated for public release and publication 
(Hussey et al., 2018). Participants in the study completed one of 190 different IATs assessing 
attitudes within a wide range of attitude domains including politics, ideologies, popular culture 
figures, and everyday preferences (total N available for analysis = 155913). Self-report attitude 
scales also assessed multiple attitude features, such as “gut feelings” versus “actual feelings” 
towards the pairs of concepts used in the IAT. Relevant subsets of this data were employed to test 
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two of the hypotheses that Dalege and colleagues put forward. Data and code for the analyses 
conducted below are available on the OSF (osf.io/c59y2).  
Prediction 1b. “Scores on implicit measures assessing attitudes individuals regularly 
think about, are expected to have higher internal consistency … than scores on implicit measures 
assessing attitudes individuals think only infrequently about” (p.20). We calculated internal 
consistency values for each type of IAT (both Cronbach’s α and McDonald’s ωt). Participants 
were also asked how frequently they thought about the two concept categories that were used in 
the IAT they completed (e.g., Democrats and Republicans). For each type of IAT (k IATs = 190, 
mean n per IAT = 1641), mean frequency ratings were also calculated, resulting in 190 pairs of 
internal consistency values and mean frequency ratings. When these pairs were entered into 
linear regression analyses, this demonstrated that the self-reported frequency with which 
participants thought about the concepts employed in the IATs was predictive of the IAT’s 
internal consistency between domains, as predicted by Dalege and colleagues. This relationship 
held across both metrics of internal consistency (α: B = 2.66, 95% CI = [0.36, 4.95], β = 0.23, 
95% CI = [0.03, 0.43], p = .024, R2 = 0.05; ωt: B = 2.92, 95% CI = [0.46, 5.38], β = 0.24, 95% CI 
= [0.04, 0.43], p = .021, R2 = 0.06). 
Prediction 3. “… when individuals are asked to very quickly answer attitude questions, 
attitudes are expected to be less polarized than when individuals are given more time to answer 
the questions. Note that the AE framework predicts that this would constitute a small effect.” 
(p.24). The Attitudes 2.0 dataset also contains self-report ratings of both “[immediate] gut 
feelings” and “actual feelings [upon reflection]” of the 190 concept category pairs. We employed 
these items to assess the hypothesis that deliberative evaluations are more extreme (i.e., 
polarized) than gut evaluations. Self-report ratings for each evaluation type were recoded as 
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absolute scores, so that positive scores represent deviation from neutrality/ambivalence without 
regard to whether those evaluations were positive or negative. A mixed-effects linear regression 
model that accounted for the nesting of evaluations within concept category domains (i.e., 
random intercept for domain and random slope for rating type) demonstrated evidence against 
this prediction: “deliberative” evaluations were found to be less extreme on average than “gut” 
evaluations (B = -0.16, 95% CI = [-0.18, -0.14], β = -0.07, 95% CI = [-0.08, -0.06], p < .001, R2 = 
0.004). As such, analyses using a very large existing dataset provide supportive evidence for one 
prediction that Dalege and colleagues put forth for the framework, however an effect in the 
opposite direction to that predicted was found for another prediction. Additional tests of the 
authors’ other predictions are of course warranted.  
Concluding Remarks 
 The Attitudinal Entropy framework interfaces concepts from statistical mechanics 
(entropy) and social psychology (attitudes) to offer an intriguing new perspective on the latter 
that has both heuristic and predictive value, as evidenced by support for one of the frameworks’ 
predictions that we were able to test with data at hand. Unlike Dalege and colleagues (this issue), 
we believe that the main scientific contribution of the framework, as put forward in their paper, is 
situated at the descriptive level and the functional level of explanation rather than the cognitive 
level of explanation. Nevertheless, the framework can be strengthened at the cognitive level of 
explanation, most prominently by incorporating more precise assumptions about the nature and 
role of inferential processes. Provided that researchers distinguish between the different levels of 
explanation to which the Attitudinal Entropy Framework contributes, the framework can provide 
a major step forward in attitude research.  
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